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ABSTRACT 
U.S. Special Forces (USSF), with its structure and training, has historically led, 
and will continue to lead, FID endeavors for the U.S. DoD.  Within USSF, Operational 
Detachment “B”s (ODB) have served, and will continue to, serve as both a command and 
control (C2) and an advisory element to ensure that USSF FID supports HN COIN 
strategies.  This thesis will refer to the combined effort as “FID/COIN,” although FID 
and COIN are separate missions under the U.S. military’s IW construct.  Given that 
FID/COIN will be the primary operational role of USSF for the next decade, coupled 
with the fact that ODBs function as the organizational entity responsible for 
synchronizing advisory efforts from the tactical to the operational level of warfare, this 
thesis will examine ODB employment, both past and present, to inform the reader on the 
ODB’s potential to contribute in FID/COIN operations.  This thesis uses USSF doctrine 
and case studies from four distinctly different FID/COIN operations in: the Republic of 
Vietnam (RVN), Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Republic of the Philippines (RP) to inform 
the reader on the ODB’s operational advisory capability with indigenous forces and 
local/regional government leaders at a level nested above its subordinate Operational 
Detachment “A”s (ODA). 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
The United States (U.S.) military’s joint doctrine defines Irregular Warfare (IW) 
as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over 
the relevant populations.  [IW] favors indirect asymmetric approaches, though it may 
employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s 
power, influence, and will.”1  The current operational environment and the future 
strategic estimate for the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) presents the military with 
global IW challenges.2  There are five primary missions associated with IW3: Foreign 
Internal Defense (FID),4 Counterinsurgency (COIN),5 Unconventional Warfare (UW),6 
Counterterrorism (CT),7 and Stability Operations (SO).8  Recently, policy makers 
 
1  U.S. Department of Defense, “Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms,” 19 August 2008, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf  (accessed 01 August 
2009). 
2 ADM Olson, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), stated that “[o]ur national security 
is threatened not only by terrorists and terrorist organizations, but also by fragile states either unwilling or unable to 
provide for the most basic needs of their people…stresses on underdeveloped and developing nations and societies, 
which in turn create regional instability and unrest. Eric Olson, “A Balanced Approach to Irregular Warfare,” Security 
Affairs Spring (2009):16, http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2009/16/olson.php (accessed 01 August 2009).   
3 From a IW briefing delivered by U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) staff officers for the IW 
conference held at Fort Bragg, NC.  The briefing was provided by COL David Maxwell, G3—USASOC, in personal 
email correspondence. 
4 Foreign Internal Defense (FID) “is the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of 
the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from 
subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency,” U.S. Department of Defense, “Joint Publication 1–02: Department of 
Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” 19 August 2008, 216, 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf  (accessed 01 August 2009).   
5  Ibid., 137. Counterinsurgency (COIN) “are those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and 
civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.”  
6 Unconventional Warfare (UW) “includes activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to 
coerce, disrupt or overthrow an occupying power or government by operating through or with an underground, 
auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area”(CDR USSOCOM approved definition of UW, sent in an email sent to the 
LTG Mulholland, USASOC Cdr on 11 June 2009).  
7 Counterterrorism (CT) are “operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, pre-empt, and 
respond to terrorism,” U.S. Department of Defense, “Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms,” 19 August 2008, 132, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf  
(accessed 01 August 2009). 
8 Ibid., 515. Stability Operations (SO) include “an overarching term encompassing various military missions, 
tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to 
maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency 
infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”  
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declared that a key component to protecting U.S. interests at home and abroad includes 
an indirect approach to defeating lawlessness, international terrorism, and insurgent 
movements by providing advisory assistance to host nation (HN) security forces and 
local/regional government leaders.9  This advisory effort is called FID10, and it is 
intended to boost a HN’s ability to prevent or defeat domestic and transnational insurgent 
movements that are operating within the HN’s sovereign borders.  The HN’s overarching 
campaign to prevent or defeat these insurgent movements is called COIN.  U.S. 
sponsored FID contributes to the HN government’s ability to take the lead in conducting 
an effective and sustainable COIN campaign.  An effective and sustainable COIN 
campaign includes creating or assisting security forces and civic administrators to out-
perform the insurgents’ ability to control the populace.  A sustainable and capable COIN 
security force is one that has the ability, at every level, to coordinate/execute operations 
against insurgents while protecting the population from insurgent attacks and/or 
intimidation. 
U.S. Special Forces (USSF), with its structure and training, has historically led, 
and will continue to, lead FID endeavors for the U.S. DoD.  Within USSF, Operational 
Detachment “B”s (ODB) have served, and will continue to, serve as both a command and 
control (C2) and an advisory element to ensure that USSF FID supports HN COIN 
strategies.  This thesis will refer to the combined effort as “FID/COIN” although FID and 
COIN are separate missions under the U.S. military’s IW construct.  Given that 
FID/COIN will be the primary operational role of USSF for the next decade coupled with 
the fact that ODBs function as the organizational entity responsible for synchronizing 
advisory efforts from the tactical to the operational level of warfare, this thesis will 
examine ODB employment, both past and present, to inform the reader on the ODB’s 
 
9 “Enduring results come from the indirect approaches—those in which we enable partners to combat violent 
extremist organizations themselves by contributing to their capabilities through training, equipment, transfer of 
technology, war gaming, and so forth,” Eric Olson, “A Balanced Approach to Irregular Warfare,” Security Affairs 
Spring (2009):16, http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2009/16/olson.php (accessed 01 August 2009). 
10 Security Force Assistance (SFA) is a similar concept to FID.  Defined as “unified action to generate, 
employ, and sustain local, host nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority,” 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual, 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance. 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2009), 1–1. By doctrine, general purpose forces conduct SFA with Brigade 
Combat Teams (BCT) or imbedded advisory teams.  The term SFA has gained notoriety, but it is still not 
included in USSF doctrine. 
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potential to contribute in FID/COIN operations.  This thesis uses USSF doctrine and case 
studies from four distinctly different FID/COIN operations in: the Republic of Vietnam 
(RVN), Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Republic of the Philippines (RP) to inform the reader 
on the ODB’s operational advisory capability with indigenous forces and local/regional 
government leaders at a level nested above its subordinate Operational Detachment “A”s 
(ODA).  
The term nested, with regard to military operations, denotes mutually supporting 
plans and/or actions in which each level of command supports the plan of its next higher 
headquarters (HQ).  GEN William E. Depuy, the first U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 
Command (TRADOC) commander, made the analogy that nested military concepts are 
like “mixing bowls in a kitchen. Each must fit within the confines of the larger and 
accommodate the next smaller and so on down to the squad, the tank, and the brave 
soldier himself.”11  To say that ODBs should assume advisory roles at a level nested 
above their subordinate ODAs means that at whatever level the ODA is operating 
(example: HN battalion), the ODB must operate at one echelon above (example: HN 
regiment comprised of two or more battalions) so that the HN COIN campaign is 
integrated from the tactical through the operational level of warfare.     
The purpose of examining USSF doctrine for this thesis is three-fold: (1) it 
provides context to understand how USSF changed its doctrine from a UW mission to a 
two-part mission consisting of UW and FID/COIN, (2) it demonstrates how the founders 
of USSF envisioned the role of the “B” detachment as an operational advisory element, 
and (3) it helps to determine whether or not doctrine adequately addresses the ODBs’ 
potential to contribute in the FID/COIN arena. 
The authors selected the case studies for the following reasons: (1) they 
demonstrate ODB advisory efforts at different stages in FID/COIN and (2) they describe 
how ODBs have operated in four distinctly different operational environments.  The 
Republic of Vietnam (RVN) case study examines ODB employment in USSF’s first 
major FID/COIN operation.  This first case study reveals a plan to broaden the ODBs’ 
 
11 William E. DuPuy, “Concepts of Operation: The Heart of Command, The Tool of Doctrine,” 
August 1988, 31, www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_00-9_shields.htm (accessed 01 
September 2009).   
 4
roles in order to better integrate the U.S. Government’s efforts with the RVN’s COIN 
strategy.  The case study from OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) examines how 
ODB 520 operated in Iraq in March of 2003.  ODB 520 transitioned from a unilateral 
direct action role hunting SCUD missiles to conducting advisory assistance in Ar Rutbah 
to restore stability following major combat operations.  The third case study comes from 
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in Afghanistan in 2004.  This case study 
examines ODB advisory efforts in a maturing FID/COIN environment.  In the OEF case 
study, the ODB advised several different militias tasked with stabilizing the Qalat region 
of eastern Afghanistan.  This case study addresses how the advisory effort evolved from 
advising militias into training, advising, and legitimizing the newly formed Afghan 
National Army (ANA).  The final case study comes from OPERATON ENDURING 
FREEDOM – PHILIPPINES (OEF-P) in which ODB 110 advised a standing professional 
military from a sovereign nation that was (and still is) engaged in a protracted COIN 
campaign.  This case study from OEF-P demonstrates the ODB’s ability to conduct 
advisory assistance in COIN environments with the HN taking the lead role in defeating 
insurgents. 
The thesis will begin with background information defining the role and 
importance of ODBs in FID/COIN operations.  The authors will then present a historic 
analysis of the ODB to show why the founders of USSF designed Special Forces Groups 
(SFG) to have ODBs and how ODBs were intended to be employed.   Following the 
historical analysis, the thesis will include a doctrinal study of USSF field manuals from 
1951 to 2001.  The doctrinal study will provide a historic framework for ODB task 
organization, missions, and employment over the past half century.  The authors will then 
present four case studies about ODBs operating in markedly different FID/COIN 
environments. Drawing from the doctrinal analysis and the case studies, the authors will 
offer recommendations on ODB training and manning in order to improve USSF’s 
capability in present and future COIN/FID operations. 
 5
                                                
Throughout this thesis, pseudonyms will be used when referring to soldiers of the 
rank of Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) and below who are still on active duty.  If the soldier is 
retired or no longer on active duty, their true name is used.  The purpose of using these 
pseudonyms is to protect their identity. 
While there is a significant amount of historic data regarding USSF and ODAs in 
particular, the ODB is a relatively unexamined operational entity of U.S. Army Special 
Operations Command’s (USASOC) forces.  However, from the inception of USSF in 
1952 to present, ODB’s have represented a unique stratum in the organizational structure 
of Special Operations Forces (SOF) operations.  In fact, LTG David Fridovich, a career 
USSF officer and the Director, Center for Special Operations (CSO) at United States 
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has said that because “ODBs offer a regional 
coordination and advisory piece” they “are the most important operational level in SF 
[USSF].” 12   
The current task organization of each Special Forces Group - Airborne (SFG) 
resembles conventional force nomenclature and structure while maintaining its unique 
organizational design to conduct all facets of IW.  Each regionally affiliated SFG 
includes three battalions (3rd and 5th SFGs recently activated a fourth battalion).  The 
modern USSF battalion, depending upon its operational role, may take on several 
different titles: Operational Detachment “C” (ODC), Forward Operating Base (FOB), and 
Special Operations Task Force (SOTF). Within each USSF battalion, there are three 
operational companies.  The USSF Company, depending upon its operational role, may 
take on several different titles: Operational Detachment “B” (ODB), B-Team, B-
detachment, Advanced Operating Base (AOB), and Special Operations Command and 
Control Element (SOCCE).   From this point forward, this thesis will refer to this element 
as the ODB.  Within each ODB, there are six Operational Detachments “A” (ODA).  The 
ODA has been and remains the primary operational element for all USSF operations.  See 
Figures 1, 2, and 3 for the current USSF task organization charts. 
 
12 Quote from a conversation between the authors and LTG David Fridovich on August 20, 2009, during a 
discussion at the 1st Regimental Formation, Fort Bragg, NC. 
 Figure 1.   Line Wire Diagram of a current Special Forces Group (Airborne)13 
 
Figure 2.   Line Wire Diagram of a current Special Forces Battalion14 
 
Figure 3.   Line Wire Diagram for a current Special Forces Company (ODB)15 
                                                 
13 Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual, 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations. 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2001), 3–1. 
14 Ibid., 3–17. 
15 Ibid., 3–25. 
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By design and by doctrinal decree, the ODB’s organizational capacity enables it 
to: (1) assume operational and advisory roles similar to an ODA, (2) provide C2 and 
synchronization to multiple ODAs much like an ODC, and (3) provide logistical, 
intelligence, and communications capabilities that are comparable to that of an ODC, 
although on a smaller scale.  The ODB’s structure and amalgam of skilled personnel 
empowers it to be an integral IW entity.  
USSF doctrine has undergone distinct changes over the past fifty-plus years.  As 
with all U.S. Army doctrine, USSF doctrine has evolved given the changing strategic 
environment and the need to incorporate lessons learned from operational deployments 
and the joint training centers.  The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defines 
doctrine as the “fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in 
support of objectives. It is authoritative, but requires judgment in application.”16  USSF 
expends manpower and funding to ensure that doctrine remains relevant.   
 
 
16 NATO Standardization Agency, “NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French) AAP-6,” 01 
March 1973, 101, http://www.nato.int/docu/stanag/aap006/aap-6-2009.pdf (accessed 01 September 2009). 
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II. HISTORIC EXAMINATION OF THE ROLES AND 
DOCTRINE OF ODBS FROM 1951–2009 
The Department of the Army officially approved the formation of the 10th Special 
Forces Group—Airborne (SFG) on June 20, 1952.17  This determination came after years 
of staff work by MG Robert McClure,18 BG Russell Volckmann,19 and COL Aaron 
Bank20 as members of the Psychological Warfare Department on the U.S. Army Staff. 21  
The organizational and functional concept for USSF originated with the resistance 
campaigns undertaken by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II, 
with its Jedburgh teams in German-occupied France and Belgium and with Detachment 
101 in Japanese-occupied Burma.  While the OSS’s level of contribution to the Allies’ 
victory is a matter of historic debate, the fact remains that military leaders and U.S. 
policy makers identified the operational and strategic potential of Unconventional 
Warfare (UW) in a war with the Soviet Union in Europe. 
COL Aaron Bank, commonly accepted as the father of modern-day USSF, wrote 
the book, From OSS to Green Berets.  Released in 1987, this book provides a first-hand 
account of the process of standing up 10th SFG.  COL Bank’s account, along with early 
USSF doctrine and secondary sources about the history of USSF, provide a foundation 
for understanding the ODB’s initial force structure and operational roles.  The initial task 
organization of what is now called an ODB comes from the operational groups (OG) of 
the OSS.  In his book, COL Bank remarks that “[a]s guidelines, I considered the 
 
17 Ian Sutherland, Special Forces of the U.S. Army 1952-1982 (San Jose: R. James Bender Publishing Company, 
1990), 19. 
18 MG Robert McClure—The commander of the U.S. Army’s Psychological Warfare Division.  MG McClure 
worked in the information operations/control field during and after WWII.  He assembled the team and lead the process 
to stand up UW capability in the U.S. Army. Alfred H. Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, Its Origins (Kansas: 
University Press, 2002) 93–94. 
19 BG Russell W. Volckmann – “survived the Japanese takeover of the Philippines during [WWII] and spent three 
years organizing over twenty thousand Filipino guerrillas.  General McClure recruited Volckmann to help develop 
plans for creation of Army Special Forces,” Alfred H. Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, Its Origins (Kansas: 
University Press, 2002) 81. 
20 COL Aaron Bank – “served with OSS as a Jedburgh and worked with Volckmann in McClure’s Office of the 
Chief of Psychological Warfare to develop plans for 10th Special Forces Group,” Alfred H. Paddock, U.S. Army Special 
Warfare, Its Origins (Kansas: University Press, 2002) 82. 
21 Sutherland, 17.  
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capabilities and operational record of the only fixed or standard type of formation that we 
had in OSS.  These were the three-man Jedburgh teams and the thirty-man operational 
groups (OG’s).”22   
This statement from COL Bank addresses the establishment of a “B” detachment 
that would operate at a higher echelon than the “A” detachments.  COL Bank declared 
that the OSS’s OG concept led to USSF’s structure of “[t]en “A” teams [that] would 
compose a company.”23  In turn, three companies would be subordinate to one “B” 
team.24  Furthermore, COL Bank envisioned that “[t]he “B” team would be allocated a 
much larger sector and would coordinate and assist the activities of a number of “A” 
teams.  And the very limited number of “C” teams would function with the upper 
indigenous (national and most important regional) echelon of a target country.”25  COL 
Bank’s descriptions reveal the framework for the modern ODB and the importance of 
nested advisory assistance.   
MG McClure, BG Volckmann, and COL Bank did not design USSF to be a 
FID/COIN force but rather a UW force.  As a result, the initial structure was designed to 
build a resistance movement, not advise/train/assist a force capable of defeating an 
insurgent element.  However, early USSF doctrine recognized that UW-related skills and 
training transitioned well into FID/COIN because of comparable requisite traits 
including: cultural awareness, language ability, and ingenuity.   
The initial USSF group structure used naming conventions different from the 
SFGs of today.  U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 31-20, U.S. Army Special Forces Group, 
from 1955 was the first doctrine for USSF.  According to the 1955 FM the SFG would 
have three “provisional battalions.”26  The term “provisional” was used because the 
doctrine was written to explain how the unit would look when it was advising an 
indigenous (provisional) guerilla force.  The provisional battalions were called Team 
 
22 Aaron Bank, From OSS to Green Berets. (New York: Pocket Books, 1987), 176. 
23 Ibid., 177. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 3–-20, U.S. Army Special Forces. 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1955), 35–37. 
Forward-Cs (FCs).  The term FC is equivalent to the current ODC (USSF battalion).  
Within each FC, there were five provisional companies called FBs.  The FB is the 
equivalent of the modern ODB.  In turn, each FB commanded 8 FAs which were the 
precursor to today’s ODA.  Figure 4 represents the line wire diagram for an SFG in 
accordance with (IAW) 1955 doctrine:   
 
Figure 4.   Line Wire Diagram for a 1955 SFG task organization.27 
The following is the first doctrinal mission statement for a “B” team in 1955:  
“[t]he team FB infiltrates to a designated area within the enemy’s sphere of influence and 
organizes a district command composed of two or more guerrilla regiments and/or 
performs such other related missions as directed.”28  From this first ODB mission 
statement it is apparent that the architects of USSF envisioned the “B” team as an 
advisory element designed to play an operational role in an environment presently known 
as IW. 
Standing up the 10th SFG provided the starting point for the formation of the 
Special Forces Regiment that, by 2009, would consist of five active duty SFGs (1st, 3rd, 
5th, 7th, and 10th) and two National Guard SFGs (19th and 20th).  While organizational 
structure, naming conventions, and doctrine (discussed, in-depth, later in this chapter) 
                                                 
27 From Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 31-20, U.S. Army Special Forces. 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1955), 36. 
28 Ibid., 37. 
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evolved over USSF’s now 57-year history,  USSF remains the only U.S. DoD Title 1029 
force that was, and is, specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct UW.   
 Given that doctrine is considered a key component in the U.S. military profession, 
the founders of USSF understood the importance of establishing doctrine in order to 
compete for legitimacy in the U.S. Army.  Prior to 1951, the U.S. Army did not have any 
Irregular Warfare (IW) related doctrine.   
The first field manuals (FM) addressing Unconventional Warfare (UW) came out 
in 1951 with the publication of Field Manual 31-20, Operations Against Guerilla Forces, 
and FM 31-21, Organization and Conduct of Guerilla Warfare.  Applying 2009 joint 
definitions, FM 31-20 can be said to be the first FID/COIN manual and FM 31-21 is the 
first UW manual.  However, because the authors wrote the 1951 FM prior to the 
formation of USSF, there is no mention of ODBs or any other equivalent structure.  The 
1951 FM’s biggest contribution is that it was the first U.S. Army doctrine to address 
COIN operations. 
 FM 31-20, U.S. Army Special Forces Group, published in 1955, was the first FM 
to focus specifically on USSF, its task organization, its core tasks, and its command 
relationships.  As stated before,  the FB’s mission statement in 1955 was to infiltrate “to a 
designated area within the enemy’s sphere of influence and organizes [sic] a district 
command composed of two or more guerrilla regiments and/or performs such other 
related missions as directed.”30  It is important to note that, although this mission 
statement reflects the ODB’s UW mission in 1955, the founders of USSF understood the 
importance of a nested advisory effort for FBs and FAs.  The FA’s mission statement is 
similar to that of an FB except that FAs were to organize one regimental sized guerrilla 
force while the FB was to organize “two or more.”31  The doctrine writers recognized 
that in UW, just as in FID/COIN, it is important for the ODB to advise host nation (HN) 
 
29 Title 10 Code of the U.S. Code outlines the legal roles of the U.S. Armed Forces as declared by the U.S. 
Congress.  
30 Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 31-20, U.S. Army Special Forces. 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1955), 37. 
31 The 1955 mission statement for an FA reads: “The team FA infiltrates to a designated area within the enemy’s 
sphere of influence and organizes a guerrilla regiment and/or performs such other related missions as directed.” 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 31-20, U.S. Army Special Forces. (Washington, DC: 
GPO, 1955), 35. 
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forces at the next level above the ODA.  Presumably, in accordance with 1955 doctrine, 
the single guerrilla regiment that the FA was to advise would operate under the control of 
a division (consisting of multiple regiments) that the FB was to advise.  This is because, 
only through multi-echelon advisory assistance, can the HN’s tactical units plan/execute 
shaping and decisive operations which support the HN government’s countrywide COIN 
campaign.   
The U.S. Army published the 1958 FM 31-20, Guerilla Warfare and Special 
Forces Operations, with only minor changes from the 1955 edition.  With regard to the 
FB, the only noteworthy addition from the 1955 FM was a specific portion addressing 
nested advisory roles at the A, B, and C levels.  According to the 1958 FM 31-20, in an 
effective and holistic UW campaign, the FB: 
(Need ellipses because quote start not a complete sentence)...has the 
capability of providing a district command organization to supervise the 
employment and control of two or more FA teams…[d]uring the early 
stages the FB team may be employed as an FA team prior to the 
requirement for a district command organization.32  
The 1958 FM’s mention of the importance of integrated advisory assistance at multiple 
levels emphasizes the fact that the FBs were to ensure continuity of effort for their 
subordinate FAs. 
 While a majority of the 1961 FM remained unchanged from the 1958 version, 
there were significant changes to the table of organization and equipment (TOE) and unit 
designations.  This FM ceased to refer to battalions, companies, and detachments as FCs, 
FBs, and FAs, respectively.  The 1961 edition stated that the SFG had four companies 
(comparable to today’s battalion), each commanded by a lieutenant colonel (LTC/O-5).  
Every company had three Operational Detachments “B,” each commanded by a major 
(MAJ/O-4).  In turn, each ODB had four Operational Detachments “A,” each one 
commanded by a captain (CPT/O-3).33  Figure 5 shows the 1958 task organization of a 
 
32 Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 31-21, Guerilla Warfare and Special Force 
Operations. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1958), 30. 
33 Ibid., 21. 
SFG, and Figure 6 shows the 1958 task organization of a USSF company with its three 
subordinate ODBs. 
 
Figure 5.   Line Wire Diagram for a 1961 SFG task organization34 
 
 
Figure 6.   Line Wire Diagram for a 1961 SF Company task organization35 
 
                                                 
34 Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 31-21, Guerilla Warfare and Special Force 
Operations. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1961), 19. 
35 Ibid., 21. 
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In 1961, the ODB’s TOE swelled to 18 men, including an officer for each staff 
section: Executive Officer (XO), Adjutant (S1), Intelligence (S2), Operations (S3), and 
Logistics (S4).36  The ODB continued to have operational components similar to those of 
an ODA, but it now gained the staff functions of an ODC.  Figure 7 is a graphical 
representation of an ODB TOE in 1961.  Presumably, this TOE change was intended to 
have ODBs become more self-sufficient operational advisory elements. 
 
Figure 7.   TOE for a 1961 ODB37 
As the advisory role in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) became a priority in 
1965, the U.S. Army updated FM 31-21, Special Forces Operations.  This update added 
five additional Soldiers to the ODB, giving it 23 personnel. Figure 8 is a graphical 
representation of a 1965 ODB.  Specifically, the modified TOE provided the ODB with 
more radio/communications specialists (note the duty description at the bottom row of the 
picture in Figure 8 – “CH RAD OP”).  
                                                 
36 Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 31-21, Guerilla Warfare and Special Force 
Operations. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1961), 22. 
37 Ibid., 24. 
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 Figure 8.   TOE for a 1965 ODB38 
Shortly after 5th SFG assumed command of USSF operations in South Vietnam, 
its leaders attempted to generate greater synergy among its operational detachments by 
creating and relying upon more ODBs.39  The ODB’s doctrinal mission in 1965 read: 
[T]he operational detachment B likewise has the capability for and staff 
responsibilities [sic], however, to a slightly lesser extent than the C 
detachment. The B detachment has a training capability and, as such, is 
suited for commitment to those areas where training as well as command 
and control are of equal importance.40  
 
                                                 
38 Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 31-21, Special Forces Operations. 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1965), 26. 
39 COL John H. Spears, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces, “Commander’s Debriefing 
Letter, 31 July 1964 – 1 July 1965.”  A primary source document stored at the U.S. Army Special Forces Archives at 
Fort Bragg, NC (accessed on August 18, 2009).  
40 Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 31-21, Special Forces Operations. 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1965), 59–60. 
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 The 1965 FM 31-21 was the first field manual to address, in depth, the advisory 
role of USSF in FID/COIN operations.  The Vietnam conflict forced USSF to shift its 
emphasis from UW to conducting FID in support of the RVN government’s COIN 
campaign. The following excerpt from the 1965 FM indicates an adaptation of doctrine 
amidst an ongoing war: 
Certain Special Forces units are highly trained in both [UW] and [COIN] 
and have the capability of providing planning, training, advice, and 
operational assistance to selected indigenous forces in counterinsurgency 
operations. The utilization of [USSF] personnel in this mission is a 
valuable adjunct to the [COIN] capabilities of MAAG’s, Missions [sic], 
and unified commands. When adequately augmented by professional skills 
not found in the [SFGA], [USSF] can provide specialized advisory 
assistance in the solution of internal defense problems through a 
combination of advisory, psychological, and military civic action 
measures. The [SFGA], operating with civil affairs, psychological 
operations, military intelligence, signal, military police, medical, and 
engineer units can be formed into a special action force (SAF) which is a 
specially trained, tailored, and an immediately available U.S. Army 
[COIN] force .41 
The 1965 FM is significant because it addressed the importance of advisory 
assistance to political leadership.  More specifically, the doctrine stipulated that USSF 
should assist in “training, advising, and providing operational assistance for host country 
military forces [and] civilian agencies engaged in [COIN] operations.”42  Just as ODBs 
were to advise HN security forces at the next higher level than their subordinate ODAs, 
so too were they to assist HN political leaders at a higher echelon.  As a result of ongoing 
COIN operations in South Vietnam, the 1965 authors indicated that ODAs as well as 
ODBs needed to “act as advisors to indigenous special forces, provincial authorities, and 
tribal leaders in the recruitment, organization, equipping, training, and operational 
employment of host country tribal elements or ethnic minority groups.”43 
 
41 Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 31-21, Special Forces Operations. 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1965), 179–180. 
42 Ibid., 181. 
43 Ibid. 
 After several years of FID/COIN operations in the RVN, the Special Warfare 
Center (SWC) released an updated FM 31-21, Special Forces Operations in 1969.  The 
1969 edition of FM 31-21 featured a modified table of organization and equipment 
(MTOE) for SFGs which used the same naming conventions and basic structure still used 
today.  SFGs consisted of three battalions with three companies per battalion.  The 1969 
TOE marked the largest ODB in the history of USSF doctrine.  Each company had 24 
Soldiers (an increase of one Soldier from the 1965 FM) and their TOE was specifically 
designed to “provide for two distinct organizations: the company headquarters as 
organized for the conduct of UW or stability [FID] operations; and the company 
headquarters as organized for direct action missions.”44  Figure 9 is a graphical 
representation of the ODB’s TOE in 1969.   
  
Figure 9.   TOE for a 1969 ODB, largest ODB in USSF doctrinal history with 24 
soldiers; current ODB has 11 soldiers45 
                                                 
44 From Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 31-21, Special Forces Operations. 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1969), 2–11. 
45 Ibid., 2–13. 
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The 1969 FM dedicated an entire section to the “[e]mployment of Special Forces 
in Stability Operations.”46  Although this had been addressed in previous doctrine, the 
updates in 1969 included additional guidance for USSF’s role as advisors for “lower 
echelon host country government officials.”47  ODBs were directed to “provide advisory 
and training assistance in functional fields that are of military or civil concern to province 
and district level governments. An important advantage gained by this employment is 
that it provides training and operational assistance to paramilitary or irregular forces 
maintained and directed by the province or district government.”48 
USSF doctrine changed little from 1969-1990.  As the U.S. ended its involvement 
in South Vietnam and leaders re-focused on a conventional war in Europe against the 
Soviet Union, the emphasis on COIN decreased.  The Special Warfare Center (SWC) 
released an updated version of FM 31-20 in 1977 with no significant updates to the 1969 
edition.  SWC did not update USSF doctrine until 1990. 
 The 1990 FM 31-20 Doctrine for Special Forces Operations reflected the fall of 
the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.  For the first time, USSF doctrine included 
the notion of a spectrum of conflict and the changing core missions of USSF to: direct 
action (DA),49 special reconnaissance (SR),50 UW, FID, civil affairs (CA),51 
 
46 Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 31-21, Special Forces Operations. 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1969), 2–13. 
47 Ibid., 10–3. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Direct Action - DA operations are normally short-duration operations with a limited scope requiring an 
SFODA to infiltrate a denied area, attack a target, and conduct a preplanned exfiltration. Headquarters, Department of 
the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual, 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations. (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001), 2–12. 
50 Special Reconnaissance -SR operations are reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by SF, 
unilaterally or through surrogate or indigenous forces. The objective of SR operations is to confirm, refute, or obtain— 
by visual observation or other collection methods — information on the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an 
actual or potential enemy. Ibid., 2–15. 
51 Civil Affairs- Those military operations conducted by civil affairs forces that (1) enhance the relationship 
between military forces and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present; (2) require coordination 
with other interagency organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, indigenous 
populations and institutions, and the private sector; and (3) involve application of functional specialty skills that 
normally are the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations. Ibid., 88. 
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psychological operations (PSYOPS),52 CT, and humanitarian assistance (HA).53  UW 
remained the cornerstone of 1990 doctrine.  However, the 1990 FM emphasized USSF’s 
ability to serve as an agile force in a rapidly changing operational environment.  The 
1990 FM outlined the specific functions of the SF Company: 
-Plan and conduct SF operations separately or as part of a larger force. 
-Train and prepare SF teams for deployment.  
-Infiltrate and exfiltrate specified operational areas by air, land, or sea.  
-Conduct operations in remote areas and hostile environments for extended 
periods with minimal external direction and support.  
-Develop, organize, equip, train, and advise or direct indigenous forces of up to 
regimental size in SO [special operations. 54  
 
In addition to its SF-specific missions, the 1990 FM outlined several USSF 
missions in support of conventional force operations.  This doctrinal trend towards 
greater conventional force interoperability came as a result of: (1) integrated 
USSF/conventional force rotations to the national training centers, (2) USSF becoming an 
official branch of the U.S. Army in 1987, rather than a collection of units with Soldiers 
and officers coming from the primary branches (infantry, armor, etc.), and (3) an Army-
wide push towards combined arms warfare meant to better integrate light, mechanized, 
special operations, indirect fire, and air mobile forces.  
By 1990, the ODB TOE receded from the 24 personnel in 1969 to just 11.  This 
included the reduction of all formal staff functions.  The decreased numbers likely 
resulted from several factors, including: (1) decreased slots for USSF; full strength ODAs 
 
52 Psychological Operations- Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign 
audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign 
governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce 
foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. 
Army Field Manual, 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations. (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001), 442–443. 
53 Humanitarian Assistance - Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters 
or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life 
or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Ibid., 249. 
54 Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual, 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces 
Operations. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1990), 4–11. 
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took priority over large ODBs, (2) one of the ODB’s primary lines of operation (LOO) at 
this time was to serve as a Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE) 
for conventional force operations; 24 personnel were not required to fulfill this 
requirement, and (3) the role of USSF in U.S. Army doctrine declined as conventional 
warfare returned to primacy. 
 The most significant addition to this FM was the introduction of FID as a 
component of HN Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) efforts.  The IDAD 
concept focused on “the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth 
and protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.”55  Furthermore, “[t]he 
IDAD strategy [was] founded on the assumption that the [HN] is responsible for the 
development and execution of programs to prevent or defeat an insurgency.”56  With 
regard to FID, the 1990 FM stated that USSF units were to “advise, and assist HN 
military and paramilitary forces.  The intent is to improve the tactical and technical 
proficiency of these forces so they can defeat the insurgency without direct U.S. 
involvement.”57  Furthermore, the 1990 FM declared that ODBs were to help run the 
provincial area coordination center.58   
 In 2001, the SWC released the first edition of FM 3-05.20, Special Forces 
Operations.  The 2001 edition marked the first significant update to USSF doctrine in 
eleven years.  With the addition of updates in 2004 addressing the SOF joint planning and 
targeting process, this FM represents current USSF doctrine.  Figure 10 is a graphical 
representation of the TOE for an ODB in accordance with 2001 doctrine.   
 
55 Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual, 31-20-3, Foreign Internal Defense for 
Special Forces. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1994). 
56.Ibid. 
57 Ibid., 10–2. 
58 Ibid., 10–7. 
 Figure 10.   TOE for a present-day ODB59 
A classified version of FM 3-05.20, 2009 is in draft form and has not yet been released.  
The 2009 version will likely include ODB TOE changes as a result of recent and 
predicted operational employment.  However, the ODB’s mission statement and specified 
tasks with respect to advisory assistance will not change substantially in the 2009 version 
of FM 3-05.20.60 
The 2001 edition was the latest doctrine available to USSF at the beginning of 
OIF, OEF, and OEF-P.  The 2001 FM addresses the criticality of FID/COIN as a 
component of U.S. military engagement. Specific to ODBs, the 2001 FM states that:  
[t]he SF Company plans and conducts SO activities in any operational 
environment-permissive, uncertain, or hostile…The SF Company 
commander, an experienced SF major…functions with its own operational 
                                                 
59 From Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual, 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations. 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2001), 3–26. 
60 Interview with CW3 John Monty (pseudonym) of the Special Warfare Director of Training and Doctrine 
(DOTD) by authors Major Brinker and Major Smith at Fort Bragg, NC on 18 August 2009. 
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detachment with its own assigned mission…[d]uring operations SFODB’s 
[act] as area commands providing C2 to the SFODAs.61  
The 2001 FM provides specified tasks for ODBs.  While there are several tasks, 
two in particular support the ODB’s operational advisory role.  In accordance with 2001 
doctrine, ODBs “conduct operations in remote areas and hostile environments for 
extended periods with minimal external direction and support [and] develop, organize, 
equip, train and advise or direct indigenous forces up to regiment size in SO [special 
operations] activities.”62  The mission statement, coupled with the tasks specified, 
supports the notion that ODBs remain doctrinally charged with fulfilling a nested 
advisory role above their ODAs in FID/COIN environments. 
With respect to ODBs, USSF doctrine, despite its TOE changes and its evolving 
emphasis on FID/COIN rather than on UW alone, has changed little. The ODB mission 
statement in 2001 resembles the 1955 mission statement for a FB.  The only notable 
difference is that the 2001 FM includes several additional tasks that the ODB must 
accomplish with regard to C2 and liaison with conventional forces. 
Although the strategic environment has changed, the doctrinal decree that ODBs 
maintain the capability to serve as operational advisory elements has not changed.   
 
61 Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual, 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations. 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2001), 3–25. 
62 Ibid., 3–27. 
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III. CASE STUDIES 
A. THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM 
It may be time to change the “name of the game” as far as the overall 
view of how [USSF] are to be used in the Cold War.  I seriously question 
the need for all of our [USSF] efforts and resources being trained for [a 
UW] role in the world today.  My experience in Vietnam has convinced me 
that a major portion of these resources should be redirected toward the 
[COIN] side of the house. 
– COL John Spears, from his Commander’s Briefing Letter 
(1964–1965) as the outgoing 5th SFGA Cdr.63 
1. Introduction 
With a few noteworthy exceptions, a majority of USSF’s operations have been in 
support of FID/COIN with HN security forces and politicians.  While some FID/COIN 
missions have included single-ODA missions to a country for training in skills such as: 
patrolling, shooting, raids, and airborne operations, other FID/COIN missions such as 
OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti in 1994 included five ODBs 
commanding “30 SFODAs which made up the entire U.S. presence outside Port-au-
Prince, the capital city, and the city of Cap Hatien.  This presence encompassed 90 
percent of Haiti’s land area and was the peacekeeping effort for approximately 90 percent 
of Haiti’s 5 million Haitians.”64  However, it was the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), 
USSF’s first FID/COIN operation, which earned USSF its notoriety as an IW force.   
A study of ODB operations in South Vietnam leads to two conclusions: (1) ODBs 
functioned very similarly to their subordinate ODAs and (2) USSF’s role as a FID/COIN 
force, rather than as a UW force as it was intended, placed unforeseen stresses on the 
organizational structure.  Although USSF operated in the RVN from 1956–1971, this 
 
63 COL John H. Spears, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces, “Commander’s Debriefing 
Letter, 31 July 1964 – 1 July 1965.”  A primary source document stored at the U.S. Army Special Forces Archives at 
Fort Bragg, NC (accessed on August 18, 2009), 12. 
64 Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual, 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations. 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2001), 3–25. 
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case study examines ODBs’ general roles in the RVN after 5th SFG arrived in 1964.  
This time frame and limited scope encapsulates only a fragment of USSF’s operations in 
South Vietnam.  The purpose of this look at ODBs in the RVN is to highlight ODB 
employment under 5th SFG in USSF’s first FID/COIN campaign. 
2. Background 
There are hundreds of books, journal articles, and even a movie starring John 
Wayne about the exploits of the “Green Berets” in the RVN.  The breadth of USSF’s 
missions in South Vietnam is significant by any measure, but many historians agree that 
USSF’s most significant contribution to the campaign was that they “trained, and fielded 
the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups [CIDG]65 that fought a large share of the war 
throughout the most threatened regions of Vietnam.”66  Furthermore “[n]ot only did 
[USSF] organize these troops for their intended role of local village security, but [USSF] 
also employed them as line infantry in crucial battles of 1965 and Tet-68.”67 
3. Task Organization 
While the role and criticality of ODBs in the RVN from 1956-1971 is relatively 
unheralded when compared to the exploits of ODAs, ODB contributions are not entirely 
undocumented.  Much of the difficulty in piecing together ODBs’ lines of operation 
(LOO) comes from the non-doctrinal structure and ad hoc troop rotations of USSF until 
5th SFG became the official group headquarters on October 1, 1964 under the command 
of COL John H. Spears.68  Prior to 5th SFG’s arrival, USSF detachments and individual 
Soldiers rotated into and out of the RVN on a temporary duty status (TDY) for 180 days 
at a time from Okinawa, Japan or Fort Bragg, NC.  As a result, there was little continuity 
and synergy among ODBs and ODAs until 5th SFG arrived.  In the summer of 1965, 5th 
 
65 Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) – Initially started by the CIA in the early 1960’s it was “[o]ne of the 
most successful innovations in [COIN]” until Military Assistance Command – Vietnam (MACV) “changed the 
program to emphasize offensive operations rather than village security.” John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife, 
Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 128–129.    
66 Shelby Stanton, Green Berets at War, U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia 1956-1975 (Novato: 
Presidio Press, 1985), 291. 
67 Ibid., 292. 
68 Ibid., 87. 
SFG included 4 ODCs, 11 ODBs, and 56 ODAs.69  USSF HQ in the RVN “controlled its 
basic operating A-Detachments through a convoluted hierarchy extending down through 
intermediate C-and B-Detachments.”70  ODAs occasionally functioned as ODBs.  For 
example, in 1968 ODA- 502 included 58 U.S. Soldiers (ODAs normally consist of 12 
Soldiers) and, according to their detachment commander, SGM (R) William Phalen, 
ODA-502 had three subordinate ODAs.71  Figure 11 is the 5th SFG organizational 
structure on October 31, 1968.  
 
 
Figure 11.   5th SFG Organizational Structure, October 196872 
                                                 
69 COL John H. Spears, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces, Commander’s Debriefing Letter, 
31 July 1964–1 July 1965.  A primary source document stored at the U.S. Army Special Forces Archives at Fort Bragg, 
NC (accessed on August 18, 2009). 
70 Shelby Stanton, Green Berets at War, U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia 1956-1975 (Novato: 
Presidio Press, 1985), 87. 
71 Interview with SGM (R) William Phalen by authors Major Brinker and Major Smith at his home in 
Fayetteville, NC on 18 August 2009.  SGM (R) Phalen served as a commissioned officer and detachment commander 
of ODA-502.  Following the Vietnam War, he returned to the NCO ranks and retired from active duty in 1990 as a 
SGM. 
72  From 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Incl 1 to 5th SFGA ORLL for Quarterly Period Ending 31 OCT 
1968, primary source document declassified 31 DEC 1974, stored at the U.S. Army Special Forces Archives at Fort 
Bragg, NC (accessed on August 18, 2009). 
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A-502, with its unlisted three subordinate A-detachments, operated as an 
equivalent organization to three B-detachments (B-55, B-51, and B-52) working directly 
for the 5th SFG headquarters (HQ).  This line wire diagram, in conjunction with the A-
502 commander’s explanation of 5th SFG’s command relationships in 1968, indicates 
organizational confusion. 
4. Discussion 
Although it is clear that ODBs had subordinate ODAs, there is no clear evidence 
to support the claim that ODBs routinely conducted advisory assistance at an operational 
level that was nested above the ODAs.  Through several secondary source accounts of 
combat operations it is apparent that many ODBs primarily conducted tactical level 
advisory assistance at the expense of conducting operational level advisory assistance.  In 
fact, historian, author, and USSF veteran Shelby Stanton proclaimed that “B-
Detachments often shared the same battlefield danger as their A-Detachments.” 73  On 
the whole, USSF conducted decentralized advisory operations.  While such 
decentralization is often lauded and glamorized by veterans from the RVN and active 
duty members of the USSF regiment, the outgoing 5th SFG commander in 1964 
determined that USSF needed to conduct its FID/COIN campaign with a more integrated 
approach.  His solution to this shortcoming was “[t]he arrival of PCS74 “B” and “C” 
detachments [that] materially strengthened our command and control capability in-
country.”75  COL Spears’ report states that prior to the arrival of PCS ODBs he found 
USSF elements in the RVN 
operating without clear purpose, out of touch with the real effort, 
contributing only a portion of their capability…[t]he detachments were 
supposed to be performing a [COIN] type mission, yet in many cases they 
understood the CIDG Program to be a type or variation of [UW] rather 
 
73 Shelby Stanton, Green Berets at War, U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia 1956-1975 (Novato: 
Presidio Press, 1985), 98. 
74 Permanent Change of Station (PCS) meant that USSF elements rotated into the country for one year as opposed 
to the temporary duty status (TDY) of USSF personnel in Vietnam prior to 5th SFGA’s arrival.  PCS provided greater 
continuity and accountability for USSF operations. 
75 COL John H. Spears, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces, Commander’s Debriefing Letter, 
31 July 1964 – 1 July 1965.  A primary source document stored at the U.S. Army Special Forces Archives at Fort 
Bragg, NC (accessed on August 18, 2009), 2. 
 29
                                                
than an adjunctive tool to countering the insurgency…the SF/CIDG effort 
had become isolated from the people and uncoordinated with other forces 
and governmental agencies involved in the total mission.”76 
COL Spears’ recommendation for more ODBs to increase advisory efforts and improve 
synchronization among the ODAs resulted in an increase in the number of ODBs from 11 
in 1965 to 16 in 1967.77 
COL Spears recognized the organizational and operational failure to achieve a 
nested advisory approach for RVN security forces and he attempted to improve the 
advisory force footprint in order to better support the RVN’s COIN strategy.  As a result, 
COL Spears made several TOE changes for ODBs (and ODAs) to “better facilitate their 
support of the Vietnamese Special Forces training center, Project DELTA78 and other 
classified activities not directly under control of the 5th [SFG].”79  COL Spears’ ODB 
TOE changes were designed to increase the ODBs’ capability to synchronize in-theater 
advisory efforts for both security forces and political leaders while retaining their 
“flexibility and training capability.”80  COL Spears coupled his FID/COIN-focused TOE 
changes for ODBs with additional commander’s guidance.  In an official memorandum 
addressed to “A, B, & C Operational Detachments” outlining his COIN program, COL 
Spears declared that he wanted ODBs to “coordinate with and assist sub-sector and sector 
[RVN politicians] in executing [the] pacification plan.”81  More specifically, COL Spears 
 
76 COL John H. Spears, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces, Commander’s Debriefing Letter, 
31 July 1964 – 1 July 1965.  A primary source document stored at the U.S. Army Special Forces Archives at Fort 
Bragg, NC (accessed on August 18, 2009), 1. 
77 Francis J. Kelly, Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961–1971, CMH 
Publication 90-23-1 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1973), http://www.history.army.mil/BOOKS/Vietnam/90-23/90-23C 
(accessed on 09 September 2009), Table 6. 
78 Project DELTA had a long-range reconnaissance and intelligence gathering mission as its basic operating 
concept. The typical reconnaissance element consisted of eight road patrol teams of four indigenous personnel each, 
and sixteen reconnaissance teams of two Special Forces and four indigenous personnel each. Ibid., 53–54. 
79 COL John H. Spears, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces, Commander’s Debriefing Letter, 
31 July 1964 – 1 July 1965.  A primary source document stored at the U.S. Army Special Forces Archives at Fort 
Bragg, NC (accessed on August 18, 2009), 8. 
80 Official Memorandum written by CPT Joseph Johnson, Assistant Adjutant for 5th SFGA, on 7 March 1965. 
Troop Unit Change Request. Primary source document is stored at the U.S. Army Special Forces Archives at Fort 
Bragg, NC (accessed on 18 August 2009). 5. 
81 Official Memorandum written by CPT Joseph Johnson, Assistant Adjutant for 5th SFGA, on 1 January 1965.  
The Special Forces Counterinsurgency Program.  Primary source document is stored at the U.S. Army Special Forces 
Archives at Fort Bragg, NC (accessed on 18 August 2009). 2. 
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directed “C, B, and especially the A detachments [to] advise local Vietnamese officials in 
the establishment of effective local government which offer to the people security and a 
democratic way of life.”82  COL Spears’ guidance demonstrates that he understood the 
importance of nested advisory assistance from the ODA to ODB to ODC level in civic-
related matters to assist the RVN government’s COIN strategy. 
5. Conclusion 
Under 5th SFG’s control, ODBs played an increasing role in synchronizing the 
RVN’s COIN campaign.  However, research reveals that ODBs in the RVN functioned 
similarly enough to ODAs that they were not a pivotal organizational entity within USSF.  
There is sufficient evidence that ODBs provided advisory assistance at a level above the 
ODAs with RVN political leaders.  However, the evidence suggests that ODBs, on 
whole, did not provide advisory assistance to RVN security forces at an echelon above 
their subordinate ODAs.  David Galula’s acclaimed 1964 book entitled, 
Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice, stresses the importance of both 
capable COIN security forces and the administrative (political) capacity to defeat an 
insurgent force.  The reasons for USSFs failure to synchronize its advisory efforts with 
the RVN security forces include, but are not limited to: (1) a failure to reorganize SFGs 
for COIN rather than UW, and (2) routinely employing HN irregular forces in 
conventional operations.  Collectively, the ODBs’ inability to integrate the RVN’s 
security forces impeded U.S. efforts to help South Vietnam with its COIN campaign. 
 
82 Official Memorandum written by CPT Joseph Johnson, Assistant Adjutant for 5th SFGA, on 1 January 1965.  
The Special Forces Counterinsurgency Program.  Primary source document is stored at the U.S. Army Special Forces 
Archives at Fort Bragg, NC (accessed on 18 August 2009). 4. 
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B. OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM—ODB 520 (IRAQ 2003): 
1. Introduction 
This case study from OIF reveals how an ODB conducting a unilateral SOF 
economy of force83 mission in Western Iraq transitioned to an advisory role that restored 
peace and order in Ar Rutbah following the conventional assault on Baghdad.  
Conducting multi-faceted advisory assistance with political leaders and law enforcement 
officials was not in ODB 520’s proscribed mission statement from its higher headquarters 
(HQ).  Furthermore, advisory assistance was neither a specified/implied task nor an 
assigned follow-on mission.  However, ODB 520 found itself thrust into a situation in 
which it had to revert back to historic and doctrinal roles of an ODB to provide advisory 
assistance to HN civic/political leaders and security force personnel.  This impromptu 
advisory role focused on gaining situational awareness and achieving control in a key 
population center in Western Iraq.  Furthermore, ODB 520 sought to restore a sense of 
dignity and normalcy to a town of people whose national government had recently been 
violently defeated by a foreign power.  This case study reveals the dynamic operational 
capability of an ODB to transition from a unilateral direct action mission to an advisory 
FID mission.  
2. Background 
In December 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ordered General 
Tommy Franks, Commander, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), to revise the 
DoD’s current strategy for conducting operations in the Middle East (Contingency Plan 
1003).84  President Bush approved an updated contingency plan, CONPLAN 1003V, that 
featured a “Running Start” concept that included a simultaneous ground and air campaign 
 
83 Robert R. Leonhard. “The principle of economy of force advises us to employ all combat power available in 
the most effective way possible; allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary effects.” “Economy of Force.” 
Originally Published in “The Armchair General.” http://www.jhuapl.edu/areas/warfare/papers/economyofforce.pdf.  
(accessed on 18 September 2009). 
84 Tommy Franks, American Soldier (New York: HarperCollins Publishers Inc, 2004), 333–335. 
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into Iraq.85  The new CONPLAN 1003V included the continual deployment of combat 
forces into Iraq as the campaign expanded, instead of waiting for a build-up of forces to 
posture outside of Iraq as in the  1990-1991 Gulf War.  Under CONPLAN 1003V   
SOCCENT had three major missions in pending operations in Iraq. Its first 
mission was to support the Coalition Forces Air Component Command – 
orchestrated hunt for SCUDS in the western desert. The second was to 
support the Coalition Forces Land Component Command ground 
campaign directed at Baghdad by leveraging Kurdish combat power in 
northern Iraq to occupy the Iraqi forces there and prevent their 
reinforcement of the Iraqi Army around Baghdad. The third mission was 
to organize and employ Iraqi regime opposition groups in the south.86 
 Furthermore, under CONPLAN 1003V, USCENTCOM gave operational control 
(OPCON) to 5th SFG over operations in Western Iraq.  The area of responsibility (AOR) 
was referred to as Coalition Joint Special Operations Task Force-West (CJSOTF-W).  
Led by 1st Battalion, 5th SFG, CJSOTF-W was responsible for the counter-SCUD 
mission.87  Its task organization included two ODBs (520 & 530) and OPCON of special 
operations forces from the United Kingdom and Australia.  In September of 2002, ODB 
520, commanded by MAJ Gavrilis, deployed from Fort Campbell, KY in support of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Once the U.S. President initiated the invasion of Iraq in March 
of 2003, ODB 520 crossed the Iraqi border with the following mission statement: “ODB 
520 conducts counter TBM (Theater Ballistic Missile) operations in Western Iraq in 
support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).”88  ODB 520 was one of two ODBs tasked 
with preventing Israel from entering the conflict as a result of a SCUD attack on the 
Israeli homeland; the counter-SCUD mission was the strategic main effort for CJSOTF-
West.  “The SCUD threat was the number one priority of the intelligence community.”89  
 
85 Charles Briscoe et al., All Roads Lead to Baghdad: Army Special Operations Forces in Iraq (Fort Bragg: 
USASOC History Office, 2006), 24. 
86.Ibid. 
87 SCUD is the term for a series of Theater Ballistic Missiles developed by the former Soviet Union.  During the 
1991 Gulf War, Iraq launched SCUDs at U.S. targets in Saudi Arabia. Iraq also launched SCUDS at Israel in an attempt 
to draw a response by Israel to undermine the Arab-U.S. Coalition. 
88 Interview with LTC (R) James Gavrilis by authors Major Brinker and Major Smith at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, CA, on 30 April 2009.   
89 Charles Briscoe et al., Al Roads Lead to Baghdad: Army Special Operations Forces in Iraq (Fort Bragg: 
USASOC History Office, 2006), 33. 
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ODB 520’s key tasks included: (1) prevent a SCUD launch from Western Iraq at all 
costs, (2) deny freedom of movement for enemy forces in Western Iraq, (3) conduct 
Special Operations in support of conventional forces operating in Southern Iraq.90  MAJ 
Gavrilis was an experienced officer who, at the beginning of OIF, was a 15-year veteran 
with over 12 years of experience in Special Operations.  Additionally, he had served as 
an infantry officer in the 25th Infantry Division, a member of Joint Special Operations 
Command (JSOC), and as an ODA commander in 3rd SFG.  Prior to crossing in to Iraq, 
MAJ Gavrilis’s purpose, key tasks, and commander’s intent for ODB 520 was: 
to prevent Israel from entering the conflict and to prevent enemy missile 
attacks on U.S. forces or bases.  We will accomplish this by infiltrating 
prior to the start of the conflict, interdicting the SCUD system at every 
point to include hide sites, launch sites, refuel/ recharge sites, 
C4/communications, and the crews psychologically, by systematically 
clearing every potential SCUD location and facility, continuously and 
obviously (so they know we are here and control the territory) patrolling 
the AO, and by conducting DA or air strikes to prevent launches and to 
defeat forces that get in the way of accomplishing our mission.91 
 After several weeks of searching suspected SCUD launch sites and engaging in 
direct-fire engagements with disparate Fedayeen92 forces, ODB 520 and its eight 
subordinate ODAs were positioned outside the city of Ar Rutbah.  MAJ Gavrilis “viewed 
the city as a major complication in” his “mission to stop the ballistic missile launches 
from western Iraq.”93  “The last thing I expected to do once we entered Ar Rutbah, a 
Sunni city of about 25,000 in Anbar province near Jordan and Syria, was to begin 
postwar reconstruction. I had not planned or prepared for governing, nor had I received 
any guidance or assistance on how to do so.”94  MAJ Gavrilis identified the need to both 
clear the city of hostile forces and return civil administration and control to the local 
 
90 Interview with LTC (R) James Gavrilis by authors Major Brinker and Major Smith at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, CA, on 30 April 2009.  . 
91 Charles Briscoe et al., All Roads Lead to Baghdad: Army Special Operations Forces in Iraq (Fort Bragg: 
USASOC History Office, 2006), 33. 
92 The Saddam Fedayeen were a group of approximately 40,000 that were extremely loyal to Saddam. Ibid., 6. 
93 James Gavrilis, “The Mayor of Ar Rutbah,” Foreign Policy, No. 151 (Nov.–Dec., 2005): 28, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/30048211 (accessed 01 July 2009). 
94 Ibid. 
Iraqis as quickly as possible.  Restoring Iraqi control over the daily functions of Ar 
Rutbah would permit ODB 520 and its ODAs to retain the flexibility to assume 
following-on missions from CJSOTF-W. 
3. Task Organization 
Immediately prior to entering Ar Rutbah, MAJ Gavrilis organized his forces to 
secure and clear the city of its hostile elements. Figure 12 is a graphical representation of 
ODB 520’s task organization.  Figure 13 is a map showing the area of responsibility 
(AOR) of ODB 520 and its subordinate ODAs. 
 
 
Figure 12.   Task Organization for ODB 520 in 200395 
 
 
                                                 
95 Interview with LTC (R) James Gavrilis by authors Major Brinker and Major Smith at the Naval Postgraduate 




Figure 13.   Operational Map from Iraq for ODB 520 in 200396 
 
ODB 520 consisted of both conventional and SOF forces. Upon entering Ar 
Rutbah, ODB 520 had operational control (OPCON) of eight ODAs.  OBD 520 included 
nine organic members (Commander, Sergeant Major, Warrant Officer, Operations Non 
Commissioned Officer (NCO), 18D97, 18B98, 18C99, 18E100, and a supply sergeant), one 
U.S. Air Force (USAF) Enlisted Terminal Attack Controller (ETAC) to assist with close 
air support, four U.S. signals intelligence soldiers, two intelligence analysts, three 
Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC) soldiers, one light wheeled vehicle mechanic, and 
three U.S. tactical psychological operations team soldiers with loudspeaker capability.  
Additionally, ODB 520 had OPCON of an Infantry Company from the 10th Mountain 
Division (approximately 120 personnel) and a three-man Civil Affairs (CA) team. 
                                                 
96 Information about ODB 520 Area of Responsibility (AOR). Interview with LTC (R) James Gavrilis by authors 
Major Brinker and Major Smith at the Naval Postgraduate School, CA, on 30 April 2009.  Map of Iraq, 
http://www.appliedlanguage.com/country_guides/iraq_country_introduction.shtml (accessed on 16 September  2009). 
97 Special Forces Medic.  
98 Special Forces Weapons Specialist. 
99 Special Forces Engineer (construction & demolitions)  
100 Special Forces Communications (tactical radios, satellite communications, etc.)  Specialist.  
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4. Discussion 
Prior to entering Ar Rutbah, MAJ Gavrilis directed his forces to: limit collateral 
damage within the city, provide medical treatment to wounded enemy combatants, and 
distribute large quantities of Iraqi government surplus food that had been kept from the 
city’s residents in a secured warehouse.  As a gesture of goodwill, MAJ Gavrilis 
instituted a cease-fire in an effort to establish trust and prove that ODB 520’s intent was 
to restore and maintain stability. 101  Within two hours of entering Ar Rutbah, ODB 520 
and its eight ODAs had secured key portions of the city, confirmed that all of the hostile 
forces had been either eliminated or run off, and had begun to “plot out the civil 
administration of the city.”102   
ODB 520 established its headquarters (HQ) in a centrally located police station 
that had been built by the British in 1927.103  Tactically, the police station provided ODB 
520 with a defendable position.  Operationally, the police station’s location supported 
ODB 520’s task of returning the city to a state of normalcy.  Within hours of establishing 
security, MAJ Gavrilis held a meeting with the local leaders, senior police officers, and 
religious leaders in order to decide on a plan to restore order in Ar Rutbah.  MAJ Gavrilis 
addressed two primary lines of operation (LOOs) with the city’s leaders:104 (1) identify 
Ar Rutbah’s civic leaders and re-instate their authority, and (2) re-establish the providing 
of basic needs to the city in order to prevent a descent into chaos.  
In order to maintain and improve security, MAJ Gavrilis appointed an interim 
police chief who agreed to enforce a no weapons carrying policy for civilians.  
Additionally, the police chief initiated the process of manning the security checkpoints on 
the main roads leading into Ar Rutbah with members of his local police force.  Prior to 
this agreement, U.S. soldiers manned these checkpoints themselves.  Given the limited 
 
101 James Gavrilis, “The Mayor of Ar Rutbah,” Foreign Policy, No. 151 (November–December 2005): 28, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/30048211 (accessed 01 July 2009). 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Line of Operation (LOO) – “lines that define the directional orientation of the force in time and space in 
relation to the enemy. They connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives.” U.S. Department of 
Defense, “Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” 19 August 
2008, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf  (accessed 01 August 2009). 
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number of U.S. forces in Ar Rutbah, the ODB 520 command team collectively 
recognized that integrating the security checkpoints with Iraqi policemen would be 
“essential for restoring local security, for protecting the city from outsiders, and for our 
[ODB 520] disengagement.”105   
Within eight hours of entering Ar Rutbah, ODB 520’s leaders had met with tribal 
and civic leaders to appoint a mayor and a city council.  ODB 520’s ability to advise both 
political and law enforcement leaders set the conditions for U.S. forces to relinquish their 
responsibility for running the city of Ar Rutbah. 
The second LOO that ODB 520 addressed was the restoration of the city’s basic 
services such as power and water.  The mayor and the city council identified electricity as 
the most important service for the citizens of Ar Rutbah.106  Working through local 
contractors and utilizing the engineering skills on ODB 520 and its ODAs, the city had 
limited power restored within days.107  Additionally, ODB 520 organized and 
implemented a “volunteer day” to remove the hardened Iraqi Army fighting positions 
from Ar Rutbah’s schools in order to resume education for the children.  In an attempt to 
increase the city’s food supply, ODB 520 identified local merchants with trading 
connections to suppliers in Jordan.  Within days, the city had received several deliveries 
of fresh meat, fruit, and luxury items.108   
Unfortunately, the gains achieved by ODB 520 were lost because follow-on 
coalition forces did not maintain the same level of contact with the people of Ar Rutbah.  
“The distance between the locals and the troops widened.  The Iraqis were eventually 
exposed and vulnerable to regime loyalists’ retribution and intimidation by foreign 
fighters.”109 
 
105 James Gavrilis, “The Mayor of Ar Rutbah,” Foreign Policy, No. 151 (November–December 2005): 32, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/30048211 (accessed July 1, 2009). 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid. 




ODB 520 demonstrated its ability to advise in both a security and civic capacity.  
The restoration of power, re-opening schools, and facilitating the resupply of market 
items in Ar Rutbah were unrelated to ODB 520’s task of preventing a SCUD launch in 
Western Iraq.  However, ODB 520’s ability to transition from a DA mission to a 
FID/COIN role indicates the ODB’s capability and organizational capacity to serve as an 
operational element. 
C. OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM—ODB 380 (AFGHANISTAN, 2004) 
1. Introduction 
This case study from OEF examines an ODB’s evolving FID/COIN mission from 
advising local militia forces that were organized, equipped, and employed to create a 
secure environment to equipping, training, and advising a newly-formed national force 
striving for recognized legitimacy from the citizens of Afghanistan.  The time period of 
this case study represents the stage in FID/COIN when operational detachments (both A 
& B) must skillfully balance their advisory efforts between local militia forces and begin 
the process to legitimize a host nation (HN) government-sponsored national force.  Once 
state-sponsored forces become operational, irregular forces continue to serve an 
important role in collecting intelligence and protecting the local populace.  And, although 
the tactical and operational results will decrease initially, the process of building a force 
that demonstrates the HN government’s ability to protect its population from violence 
and intimidation from insurgent forces is an important process in COIN.   
The OEF case study reveals the operational capability of an ODB, which actively 
pursued and assumed advisory roles to increase the HN’s COIN capability while 
simultaneously fulfilling the ODB’s C2 and logistical responsibilities to its subordinate 
ODAs.  ODB 380’s dual advisory role with Afghani security forces, both militias and 
ANA, and working with regional political leaders one to two levels above ODA-affiliated 
political leaders, is in keeping with the spirit and decree of USSF doctrine.  ODB 380’s 
struggle to legitimize the ANA came from both the infancy of the Afghani central 
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government and the challenges associated with converting local militia forces with local 
goals/perspectives to a national force with national goals/perspectives.   
Due to the operational environment and the HN’s reliance on local militia forces 
in lieu of a national force for a majority of ODB 380’s deployment to Afghanistan, ODB 
380 was unable to institute a nested advisory plan for its correlated HN security forces 
down through the HN security forces working directly with ODB 380’s subordinate 
ODAs.  In the latter stages of ODA 380’s OEF rotation, the Afghan government declared 
that the ANA would become the legitimate national force.  Creating a nested advisory 
structure for the ANA unit working with the ODB down through the ANA units working 
with ODB 380’s five subordinate ODAs would have improved the ANA’s ability to 
plan/execute operations with decreasing levels of U.S. involvement.  The ANA’s 
legitimization, in the eyes of the population, would likely have increased if the ANA had 
become more self-sufficient and if the local ANA’s actions were congruent with the 
Afghani Interim Authority (AIA)’s larger COIN campaign.  
On the one hand, due to its operational integration and cohabitation with multiple 
Afghani security forces, ODB 380’s 2004 OEF rotation would have been in compliance 
with the 2009 Afghanistan COIN guidance from the current International Security Force 
Assistance (ISAF) Commander, GEN Stanley McChrystal: 
…[b]uild local ownership and capacity. Together with [Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan – GIRoA] leaders, work all local issues 
with the local shura and community…[p]artner with ANSF, [l]ive, eat, and 
train together, plan and operate together, depend on one another.110   
But on the other hand, because of ODA 380’s inability to institute a nested advisory 
approach to improve the legitimacy of the ANA at both the tactical and operational level, 
ODA 380 would not have met GEN McChrystal’s 2009 expectation to “[b]uild their 
[ANA] capacity to secure their own country…[i]ntegrate your command and control 
structures.”111 
 
110 GEN Stanley McChrystal, ISAF Commander, “ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance,” 5. 
Released in August of 2009. 
111 GEN Stanley McChrystal, ISAF Commander, “ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance,” 5. 
Released in August of 2009. 
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2. Background 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the military operation to topple the Taliban 
Government in Afghanistan and kill or capture Al Qaeda (AQ) elements being supported 
and quartered by the Taliban, began on October 19, 2001.112  By November of 2001, 
Afghani forces advised, equipped, and employed by 5th SFG, and assisted by lethal 
bombing support from the U.S. Air Force (USAF), controlled the cities of Kandahar and 
Kabul.  The fall of these two key population centers “marked the collapse of the Taliban 
government and the disintegration of its fighting forces.”113  At this point, the AIA began 
its transition to running the country while coalition and U.S. forces continued to conduct 
offensive operations to kill/capture Al Qaeda leaders and defeat factionalized Taliban 
elements.114  In November of 2001, U.S. operations in OEF transitioned from UW to 
FID/COIN.  However, the FID/COIN mission in November 2001 was challenging 
because there was no legitimate HN government to assist and there were no government-
sponsored security forces with whom to work.  In order to maintain a semblance of 
security, the AIA and USSF had to continue to rely on the tribal militias that existed prior 
to USSF’s arrival into Afghanistan.   
In July of 2004, ODB 380, commanded by MAJ Rice (pseudonym), deployed 
from Fort Bragg, North Carolina in support of OEF.  ODB 380 deployed to Afghanistan 
with the following mission statement:  “ODB 380 conducts unconventional 
warfare/counterinsurgency operations O/A 22 July 04 – UTC [until complete] in JSOA 
Maryland and AO Cacti to kill/capture ACM [Anti-Coalition Militia].”115  The ODB’s 
key tasks included: (1) “conduct mounted and dismounted long range reconnaissance,” 
(2) “find, fix, kill/capture ACM,” (3) “conduct area assessments to include ISBs 
[intermediate support bases] for future use,” (4) conduct area assessments for future 
 
112 Charles Briscoe, Richard Kiper, James Schroder, Kalev Sepp, Weapon of Choice: ARSOF in Afghanistan 
(Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 47. 
113 Ibid., 383. 
114 Ibid.  
115 Interview with LTC Cooper Rice (pseudonym) by authors Major Brinker and Major Smith at Fort Bragg, NC 
on 17 August 2009. 
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IO/HA/CA [information operations116/humanitarian assistance/civil affairs] projects to 
influence the populace and separate the insurgents from their support bases.”117   MAJ 
Rice, at the time a 12-year military veteran with service as an infantry officer in the 82nd 
Airborne Division, 2nd Battalion/75th Ranger Regiment, and as an ODA commander in 
3rd SFG, defined ODB 380’s desired end state as:  
Friendly forces postured to continue combat operations integrated with 
IO/CA/HA.  ACM support and influence disrupted in JSOA [joint special 
operations area] Maryland/AO [area of operations] Cacti.  AO’s secured 
and stabilized IOT allow unimpeded progress during the post-election 
time period.118 
Qalat, the location of the ODB headquarters, had become a “hub of ACM [Anti 
Coalition Militia] activity flowing through the [operational] area…heavily influenced by 
Taliban leaders and HIG [Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin] terrorists.”119  Deh Afghanan (Fire 
Base Lane) had purportedly become a key node of “ACM build up in Bolan [with] 
reports of up to 200 ACM equipped with AK-47s, PKMs, RPGs, [and] recoilless 
rifles.”120  Intelligence reports on Shinkay (Fire Base Sweeny), included an “increase in 
ACM terrorist activity [in the] Maruf Valley.”121  Furthermore, multiple human 
intelligence sources reported a “large presence of ACM in [the] Arghastan and Maruf 
districts.”122  
 
116 Information Operations (IO) –”The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, 
computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with 
specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated 
decision making while protecting our own.” U.S. Department of Defense, “Joint Publication 1-02: Department of 
Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” 19 August 2008, 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf  (accessed 01 August 2009), 263. 
117 Interview with LTC Cooper Rice (pseudonym) by authors Major Brinker and Major Smith at Fort Bragg, NC 






3. Task Organization 
 MAJ Rice organized his ODB into three elements based upon the enemy 
situation, terrain, and operational requirements.  Figure 14 is a graphical representation of 




Figure 14.   Task Organization for ODB 380 in 2004123 
                                                 
123 Interview with LTC Cooper Rice (pseudonym) by authors Major Brinker and Major Smith at Fort Bragg, NC 
on 17 August 2009. 
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 Figure 15.   Operational Map from Afghanistan for ODB 380 in 2004124 
The three elements included: (1) ODB 380 located in Qalat, (2) two ODAs 
located in Deh Afghanan, and (3) three ODAs located in Shinkay (See Figure 15).125   
The members of ODB 380 included eight organic members (Commander, 
Sergeant Major, Warrant Officer, Operations Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) / 
18D126, 18B127, 18E128, and a supply sergeant), one Civil Affairs NCO, and one 
intelligence analyst.  Additionally, ODB 380 included one category two (CAT II) 
                                                 
124 Interview with LTC Cooper Rice (pseudonym) by authors Major Brinker and Major Smith at Fort Bragg, NC 
on 17 August 2009. The map of Afghanistan obtained from 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/afghanistan_pol_93.jpg, (accessed on 16 September 2009).  
125 Ibid. 
126 18D – Special Forces Medic 
127 18B – Special Forces Weapons Specialist 
128 18E – Special Forces Communications (tactical radios, satellite communications, etc.) Specialist 
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interpreter and one category one (CAT I) interpreter.129  The ODB in Qalat, including its 
two interpreters, had eleven people.  Additionally, ODB 380 exercised operational 
control over approximately 40 Afghan Security Force (ASF) personnel.   
The two ODAs located in Deh Afghanan lived together on Fire Base Lane.  
Although they were co-located in order to facilitate security and logistics, each ODA 
conducted its operations and advisory assistance separately.  Together, these ODA’s 
included: 17 (8 from ODA 3XX and 9 from ODA 3XX) USSF qualified soldiers, two 
light wheeled vehicle mechanics, one USAF Enlisted Terminal Attack Controller 
(ETAC) to assist with close air support, one U.S. Army cook, one civilian contractor for 
engineer support, a twenty-man platoon from 2nd Battalion/35th Infantry Regiment/ 25th 
Infantry Division, eleven soldiers from the U.S. Army 528th Engineer Battalion, two U.S. 
embedded training team soldiers, two CAT II interpreters, 80 ANA soldiers, and 91 
Afghan Security Force (ASF) soldiers.  The ANA, in 2004, was a newly formed entity 
that consisted of soldiers from the Afghan Militia Forces (AMF) with whom USSF had 
worked extensively from 2002 to 2004.  The ASF, also largely drawn from the ranks of 
the AMF, were locally hired and trained forces meant to provide additional security on 
large scale and/or complex operations that the ANA was ill-equipped/trained to handle.  
The ASF were not intended to be an enduring force.  However, their capability was 
important because they operated near or around their home villages.  The ASF had 
greater situational awareness and innate intelligence gathering capability than their ANA 
counterparts who came from different regions of Afghanistan.  The entire task force on 
Fire Base Lane, including both U.S. and Afghani nationals, consisted of 238 
personnel.130 
The three ODAs located in Shinkay on Fire Base Sweeny, like those on Fire Base 
Lane, also lived together, but conducted most of their operations separately.  Together, 
these three ODAs included: 26 [(10 from ODA 3XX, 8 from ODA 3XX, and 8 from 
ODA 3XX)] USSF qualified soldiers, four U.S. signals intelligence soldiers, two U.S. 
 
129 A CAT I interpreter is a locally hired interpreter who does not have any vetting or a security clearance.  CAT 
I interpreters are used for pure translation.  A CAT II interpreter is a U.S. citizen with a secret clearance.  They are used 
for more sensitive operations that require greater degrees of trust and legal accountability. 
130 Interview with LTC Cooper Rice (pseudonym) by authors Major Brinker and Major Smith at Fort Bragg, NC 
on 17 August 2009. 
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tactical psychological operations team soldiers, two U.S. CA soldiers, two USAF 
ETAC’s, two U.S. intelligence analysts, three embedded training team soldiers, three 
CAT II interpreters, nine CAT I interpreters, one U.S. Army cook, 81 ANA soldiers, and 
60 ASF soldiers.  The entire task force on Fire Base Sweeny, including both U.S. and 
Afghani nationals, consisted of 195 personnel.131 
4. Discussion 
 ODB 380 had several lines of operation (LOOs).132  As the ODB commander, 
MAJ Rice had to prioritize his LOOs in order to support mission objectives, provide 
command and control (C2) to ODAs, and provide logistical support to the ODAs.  Of 
ODB 380’s LOOs, MAJ Rice rated his most crucial to be providing advisory assistance 
and intelligence fusion with an Afghani intelligence/paramilitary force called the 
National Defense Service (NDS).  This superbly led forty-man element, which was co-
located in Qalat with ODB 380, provided accurate and timely intelligence.  More 
importantly, NDS’s leader provided keen insight into: ACM networks, ACM supporters 
among the local populace, the loyalty of ANA and ASF soldiers, and the veracity of 
information from local contacts.  As the ODB commander, MAJ Rice met daily with this 
unit’s leader to discuss intelligence and operational matters.  Establishing and 
maintaining trust with NDS became crucial to ODB 380’s accomplishment of its mission 
because there was not a comparable HN force in the area.   
 In addition to the NDS detachment, ODB 380 provided advisory assistance to a 
120-man ANA battalion.  Providing advisory assistance to this battalion served as ODB 
380’s second highest priority LOO.  This battalion, although limited in capability when 
compared to the NDS force, represented the new face of legitimacy for the Afghan 
government.  MAJ Rice cultivated his relationship with the ANA battalion commander 
and his staff through daily meetings and planning sessions about present and future 
 
131 Interview with LTC Cooper Rice (pseudonym) by authors Major Brinker and Major Smith at Fort Bragg, NC 
on 17 August 2009. 
132 Line of Operation (LOO) - “lines that define the directional orientation of the force in time and space in 
relation to the enemy. They connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives.” U.S. Department of 
Defense, “Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” 19 August 
2008, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf  (accessed 01 August 2009), 308. 
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operations.  ODB 380’s advisory relationship helped to shape operations in the area 
because this ANA battalion was continuously capable of providing a platoon to react to 
time sensitive intelligence.133  Furthermore, this ANA battalion included a mortar 
platoon whose assets could support the ODB’s operations as well as the ODAs’ 
operations in Dehafghanan and Shinkay.  This ANA battalion had no formalized chain of 
command at the regimental or division level.  Furthermore, this ANA battalion did not 
have any supervisory authority over the ANA units working directly with ODB 380’s 
subordin
 The third advisory component of ODB 380’s operations consisted of a 40-man 
ASF element.  ODB 380 relied primarily on this ASF element to provide reconnaissance, 
security, and operational capability in order to preclude the ODB from having to rely on 
the ODA’s indigenous forces for support for operations in Qalat.  This 40-man force 
lived within ODB 380’s compound and provided MAJ Rice with the flexibility to move 
around Qalat to meet with local leaders, react to time sensitive targets, and, when called 
upon, support ODA operations.  Once again, ODB 380 was the only U.S. element 
providing advisory assistance to this ASF force.  This ASF force had no higher or lower 
echelons that would have better integrated ODB 380’s advisory efforts with the national 
COIN strategy in Afghanistan.  
 A less pressing, yet no less challenging LOO for ODB 380, included meeting with 
the provincial governor.  The provincial governor, according to (now) LTC Rice, was an 
active Taliban supporter and political appointee.  He provided little legitimate 
governance, but he did serve an important role in adjudicating local and provincial 
disputes.134   Even though his motives were often unscrupulous, the provincial governor 
was someone with whom MAJ Rice maintained an open dialogue because of his political 
influence.  While acting on the age-old axiom of “keep your friends close and your 
enemies closer,” MAJ Rice conducted weekly and sometimes daily meetings with the 
governor of Qalat.  In so doing, the ODB had greater influence in its AO.  By keeping the 
 
133 Interview with LTC Cooper Rice (pseudonym) by authors Major Brinker and Major Smith at Fort Bragg, NC 
on 17 August 2009. 
134 Ibid. 
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provincial governor abreast of forthcoming reconstruction projects and limited 
operational matters, ODB 380 built leverage in shaping future operations in the province.  
ODB 380 did not ignore its liaison role with U.S. conventional forces.  While not 
its primary LOO (which is not always the case in recent USSF operations in OIF), ODB 
380 provided key interface with elements of the 25th Infantry Division.   
 While ODB 380’s operational accomplishments were many, its most enduring 
and important accomplishment, according to its commander, was building strong 
personal relationships with leaders from the ANA, ASF, and the NDS.  Persistent 
engagement with these units’ leaders paid dividends for ODB 380 and its attached ODAs.  
Developing strong relationships and trust with indigenous force leaders should be one of 
the ODB’s priorities because such relationships are critical in building an effective COIN 
team. 
5. Conclusion 
ODB 380, during its rotation to Afghanistan from July to December of 2004, 
worked as an operational advisory element.  In accordance with doctrine, ODB 380 
provided advisory assistance to both military/paramilitary forces as well as with 
regional/provincial political leaders.  ODB’s co-habitation and relationships with multiple 
Afghani security elements enabled ODB 380 to be an active contributor in FID/COIN 
operations in Qalat and its surrounding areas.  According to LTC Rice, ODB 380’s most 
noteworthy contribution to FID/COIN in Afghanistan was the relationships it built with 
Afghan security personnel (revived by subsequent OEF deployments).  LTC Rice 
admitted that his two regrets were: (1) he did not do enough to support legitimizing the 
ANA, and (2) ODB 380 did not do enough to build formalized processes and command 
relationships to support a common COIN strategy in Afghanistan.  Formalized and 
integrated advisory structures would likely have improved continuity and synergy among 
rotational USSF operational detachments (both “A” and “B”) that serve for 6–8 months at 
a time in Afghanistan.  Such continuity would have steadily improved the capabilities and 
legitimacy of the ANA.   
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D. OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (PHILIPPINES)—ODB 110  
(2005–2006) 
1. Introduction 
This final case study captures the nuances and challenges of conducting 
FID/COIN with a professional military operating in a sovereign country, something not 
discussed in doctrine.  Yet the USSF advisory role in the Republic of the Philippines (RP) 
marks the best case scenario for U.S. sponsored FID/COIN.  The FID efforts in the RP 
demonstrate advisory assistance in a country with an integrated, albeit deficient, COIN 
strategy.  The RP has an IDAD plan, and USSF advisory efforts have had to fit this 
IDAD strategy.  USSF advisory efforts in OEF (P) featured a nested advisory approach 
from the ODB down through the ODA level.   
In 2005, Task Force Comet consisted of one Philippine Army Brigade (104th 
Bde) and one Philippine Marine Corps Brigade (3rd Marine Bde).135  The parallel 
support and information sharing structures of the ODB with Task Force Comet and 
Philippine Army and Marine Brigade headquarters (HQ) in combination with ODA 
advisory efforts at the battalion level achieved commendable results.  However, although 
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) was modeled after the U.S. military, the ODB 
commander had to learn the personalities, staff procedures, politics, limitations, and 
capabilities of the AFP in order to provide meaningful advisory assistance. 
2. Background 
 The U.S.’s history in the Philippine Islands is a storied one.  Furthermore, the 
U.S. Army’s historic role in the Philippine’s Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao 
(ARMM), where ODB 110 operated from October 2005 to March 2006, remains a topic 
of discussion among the Moro population on Sulu Island.  Despite consistent engagement 
with the AFP in its struggle with communist insurgents of the New People’s Army (NPA) 
in Luzon throughout the 1980s and 90s, the Philippine government has remained guarded 
about the U.S. military presence within its borders.  While the U.S. continued to provide 
 
135 LTC John Mallory (pseudonym). Telephonic interview by the authors Major Brinker and Major Smith on 26 
August 2009.   
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both direct and indirect FID to the AFP against the NPA, the AFP battled Islamic 
insurgents in the ARMM.  The AFP fought the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) 
on Sulu Island in the 1970s and 1980s before battling its splinter group called the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the 1980s and 1990s.  Beginning in the early 1990s, 
the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), named after Rasul Sayyaf who ran a mujahidin camp in 
Afghanistan during the Soviet Invasion, inspired a stalwart following on Sulu and Basilan 
Islands.136  Elements from 1st SFG conducted FID/COIN with the AFP against the ASG 
on Basilan Island in 2002.137  In 2002, the Philippine government requested U.S. 
assistance in defeating insurgent elements on Sulu Island.138  The AFP and the Joint 
Special Operations Task Force – Philippines (JSOTF-P) Commander consulted the 
governor of Sulu Island, Governor Loong, on the prospect of U.S. operations on Sulu.  
The governor said that “what you [the U.S.] did on Basilan, I want on Sulu.”139   
3. Task Organization 
ODB 110 was the largest USSF element to deploy to Sulu Island to conduct FID 
in support of the RP’s COIN campaign.  Initially, ODB 110 deployed to Sulu Island with 
its 7-man detachment and two ODAs.  However,  by December 2005, ODB 110 included: 
(1) a seven-man ODB (Commander, Sergeant Major, Operations Officer, Operations 
NCO, Operations Warrant, 18E, 18D,), (2) five ODAs, (3) three CA soldiers, (4) three 
intelligence analysts, (5) three signals intelligence personnel, and (6) two light wheeled 
mechanics.  Additionally, ODB 110 had operational control (OPCON) of a U.S. Marine 
Corps (USMC) security platoon consisting of 25 personnel.  ODB 110, including its  
enabling attachments, consisted of 43 U.S. personnel.  Figure 16 is a visual representation 
of ODB 110’s task organization.  Figure 17 depicts Southeast Asia and the Sulu 
Archipelago. 
 
136 Maria Ressa, Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda’s Newest Center of Operations in 
Southeast Asia (New York: Free Press, 2003). 
137 David Fridovich and Fred Krawchuk, “Winning in the Pacific: The Special Operations Forces Indirect 
Approach,” Joint Forces Quarterly 44, (1st QTR, 2007): 26. 
138J. Hastings and K Mortela, “The Strategy-Legitimacy Paradigm: Getting it Right in the Philippines.” Master’s 
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008.  
139Ibid., 78.  A quote from LTC Gregory Wilson, JSOTF-P Commander.  The quote was included in the Hastings 
and Krishnamurti thesis. 
 Figure 16.   Task Organization for ODB 110 in 2005140 
 
Figure 17.   Operational Map from Sulu Island for ODB 110.  Island is often referred to by 
its capital city of Jolo.141 
                                                 
140LTC John Mallory (pseudonym). Telephonic interview by the authors Major Brinker and Major Smith on 26 
August 2009.   




                                                
4. Discussion 
 ODB 110 deployed to Sulu Island, ARMM, Republic of the Philippines (RP) with 
the stated mission:  “ODB 110 advises and assists [Joint Task Force] JTF Comet to defeat 
Abu Sayyaff and Jamah Islamiayah in order to protect Philippine and American citizens 
and interests from terrorist attack and enhance the legitimacy of the Philippine 
Government.”142  ODB Commander, (now) LTC Mallory (pseudonym), a career Special 
Forces officer with experience in the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) and U.S. 
Central Command (USCENTCOM) areas of responsibility (AOR), deployed his 
detachment from 1st Battalion, 1st SFG(A) in Okinawa, Japan to Camp Bautista on Sulu 
Island from October 20, 2005 to March 29, 2006.   
Prior to deploying his ODB, MAJ Mallory (now LTC) declared his key tasks to 
be (in order of priority): “(1) AFP assessment/gain rapport, (2) conduct targeted CMO, 
(3) capacity building of AFP, (4) targeted kinetic operations against ASG/JI leaders, and 
(5) transition of COIN primacy to the Jolo [Sulu] police.”143  
 The inherent constraints to operating in a sovereign country with constitutional 
limits on foreign military involvement made ODB 110’s advisory efforts significantly 
different from those of ODB 380 while operating in Afghanistan in 2004 and ODB 520 
operating in Iraq in 2003.  The RP constitution prohibits foreign nations from conducting 
direct combat operations on Philippine soil.  The ODB’s co-location with TF Comet 
headquarters (HQ) on Camp Bautista proved fortuitous because their close proximity to 
the TF Comet staff enabled them to quickly build rapport and provide integrated advisory 
assistance at both the task force and brigade level early in the deployment.  However, TF 
Comet leaders remained reluctant to allow ODAs to leave Camp Bautista and conduct 
advisory assistance with the Filipino Marine and Army battalions located on separate 
outposts across Sulu Island.  Fortunately, TF Comet initiated OPERATION SHADOW 
and OPERATION TUGIS shortly after ODB 110’s arrival on the ground.  OPERATION 
SHADOW, a Philippine Army operation on Sulu Island, and OPERATION TUGIS, a 
 
142 LTC John Mallory (pseudonym). Telephonic interview by the authors Major Brinker and Major Smith on 26 
August 2009.   
143 Ibid. 
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Philippine Marine Corps operation also on Sulu Island, both served to kill or capture 
ASG elements.144  “These two three-week operations allowed ODB 110 to assess the 
capability of TF Comet (both Marine and Army) units more completely and holistically 
than [ODB 110 or its subordinate ODAs] would have accomplished in six months of non-
combat capacity building.”145  ODB 110 was able to identify areas of improvement for 
the AFP given these two operations, and enabled MAJ Mallory to convince the TF Comet 
commander to employ liaison coordination elements (LCEs) with each battalion to 
provide advisory assistance.  As a result, Mallory’s ODAs (referred to as LCEs in OEF-
P) now had the AFP’s authority to move on to AFP camps and conduct advisory 
assistance at the battalion level.  With the LCEs co-located with each battalion and with 
ODB 110 located at TF Comet HQ on Camp Bautista, MAJ Mallory could now lead a 
nested advisory effort with a parallel information sharing structure at each AFP battalion.  
By assessing TF Comet’s ability during combat operations and providing sound advisory 
assistance, ODB 110 had accomplished its priority LOO: “AFP assessment/gain 
rapport.”146 
Following OPERATION SHADOW and OPERATION TUGIS, ODB 110 
continued its advisory role with TF Comet while conducting targeted civil military 
operations (CMO).  With the LCEs providing targeted CMO and  tactical capacity-
building advice to the AFP battalions in concert with ODB 110 influencing the Army and 
Marine Corps Brigade HQs on how, when, and where to focus its U.S.- funded CMO 
projects, USSF FID/COIN efforts on Sulu Island took on an integrated effect up and 
down TF Comet’s chain of command.   
However, this nested advisory effort with the AFP was not without its challenges.  
The logistical constraints, politics, personalities, and inter-service rivalries among the 
AFP on Sulu Island impeded operational integration.  The difference in advisory 
assistance with a professional military as compared to a marginally legitimate militia in 
Afghanistan became even more apparent.  ODB 110 had to work within the traditions and 
 
144 LTC John Mallory (pseudonym). Telephonic interview by the authors Major Brinker and Major Smith on 26 
August 2009.  . 
145 Ibid.   
146 Ibid. 
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bureaucracy of the AFP in order to influence the COIN effort.   Mallory and his ODB had 
to work within the AFP system to generate operational initiative.  For example, if MAJ 
Mallory and one of his LCE commanders believed that a particular AFP battalion should 
increase combat patrols in an area because of increased enemy activity, then the ODA 
commander would begin suggesting to the AFP battalion commander that he should seek 
permission from the AFP Brigade HQ to conduct increased patrolling operations.  
Concurrently, Mallory would work through the TF Comet commander or one of the two 
brigade commanders to produce a formal order tasking the battalion to conduct increased 
patrolling operations.  This nested advisory effort with its inherent parallel information-
sharing network ensured that the subordinate commanders retained initiative while not 
exceeding their operational freedom to conduct COIN operations.  Such synchronization 
ensured that the TF Comet HQ retained situational awareness on all operations while 
subordinate battalion commanders exercised initiative in their respective areas. As MAJ 
Mallory put it, the ODB had to tailor its advisory efforts to use the AFP’s official orders 
process.   
Mallory tasked his LCE commanders with figuring out what motivated their 
counterpart AFP battalion commanders to take operational initiative.147  For example, in 
the case of the 35th Infantry Battalion (IB), MAJ Mallory advised the TF Comet 
Commander to designate the 35th (IB) as the main effort on all brigade sized operations 
so that the 35th IB would put forth the requisite assets and command influence to achieve 
the best results for the brigade.148  The [AFP] battalion commanders needed formal 
orders from the TF Comet or Brigade Commander to initiate operations.  According to 
LTC Mallory, it was his job, when necessary, to influence the higher-level commanders 
to provide the battalion commanders with formal orders to conduct offensive operations 
against insurgent groups.149  
 In Western-style professional militaries, the staffs are normally an integral part of 
the military decision making process (MDMP).  The RP modeled its military after the 
 
147 LTC John Mallory (pseudonym). Telephonic interview by the authors Major Brinker and Major Smith on 26 




U.S. military following Philippine independence from the U.S. in 1946.  As such, ODB 
110’s advisory efforts had to account for staff processes.  However, unlike the U.S. 
military’s staffs, the TF Comet staffs did not lead the MDMP.  Rather, the TF Comet 
commander led a commander-driven MDMP.   As a result, MAJ Mallory had to ensure 
that the bulk of his advisory effort went towards working with the actual commander and 
not spending excessive hours with the staff.  ODB 110 used its operations NCO to get an 
idea about what the AFP  staffs (Army, Marine, and TF Comet) were going to propose to 
their commander so that MAJ Mallory could work in conjunction with, not in opposition 
to, what the AFP staff intended to propose to its commander.   
 In addition to TF Comet, ODB 110’s advisory efforts supported the RP’s IDAD 
strategy with assistance to Sulu Island’s civic leadership.  The CA team attached to ODB 
110 established a civil military operations center (CMOC) on Camp Bautista to assist the 
AFP in its coordination with local government leaders.  This holistic approach to COIN, 
which comes straight from the U.S.’s IDAD strategy, became a critical LOO for ODB 
110. Historically, the AFP had been perceived by the people on Sulu as a heavy-handed 
pacification force.  One of ODB 110’s assigned tasks from Special Operations Command 
Pacific (SOCPAC) was to work to legitimize the AFP and the local government.  The 
CMOC served as a focal point for both the AFP and Sulu’s political leaders to plan and 
coordinate CA projects.  CA projects sought to prove to Sulu’s population that the RP 
government was receptive to its needs.  ODB 110 realized that CA projects would be one 
of its most potent LOOs in an effort to isolate insurgent elements from the population.  
As such, ODB 110 used its advisory role to build support for and initiate targeted CA 
projects with both the AFP and Sulu’s political leaders.  Again, because ODB 110 was 
conducting direct support FID to augment the RP’s COIN strategy on Sulu Island, it had 
to ensure that its advisory efforts kept the HN in the lead for all operations. 
5. Conclusion 
USSF doctrine does not provide a framework for ODB FID/COIN advisory 
operations in scenarios like OEF-P.  This case study reveals how an ODB applied its 
advisory skills within the framework of working with a standing military.  The advisory 
effort had to take into account the bureaucratic nature of professional militaries in order 
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to influence the operational tempo and focus.  While ODB 380 in OEF had nearly 
absolute authority over its paid militias in order to shape its environment, ODB 110 had 
to work through the AFP on all matters in order to support the RP’s COIN strategy. 
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IV. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
 Capable advisory assistance at both the tactical and operational level of warfare in 
U.S. sponsored FID/COIN operations is important.  Furthermore, the ODB’s role in 
USSF operations as the organizational entity that is responsible for integrating tactical 
and operational objectives is evident in both doctrine and practice.  Although General 
(GEN) McChrystal, the current ISAF Commander in Afghanistan, is not referring 
directly to, or about, USSF in his Commander’s assessment to the Secretary of Defense 
(SECDEF) regarding COIN strategy in Afghanistan, his convictions about the necessity 
for nested advisory assistance for Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are consistent 
with this thesis’s assertions about the ODB’s operational advisory role in all FID/COIN 
environments.  With regard to advisory assistance with ANSF, GEN McChrystal states 
that U.S. forces must be “radically more integrated and partnered” with Afghan units.150  
Furthermore, GEN McChrystal states that in order to achieve greater FID/COIN results in 
Afghanistan, ISAF advisors must expand “coalition force partnering at every echelon”151  
With Afghanistan emerging as the U.S.’s most challenging FID/COIN struggle since 
South Vietnam, GEN McChrystal’s principles regarding advisory assistance in 
FID/COIN apply directly to ODBs because USSF will continue to conduct advisory 
missions, of varying scale, across the globe for the foreseeable future.   
It is difficult to define precise or optimal employment for ODBs because, as 
shown in the case studies, operational environments can be vastly different.  However, 
ODBs are capable, as shown in the case studies, of contributing to FID/COIN operations 
when they assume an operational advisory role with both HN forces and civic leaders.  
This thesis makes a case for the ODB as a flexible operational element.  In order to 
enhance the ODB’s capacity to contribute in FID/COIN environments, the authors make 
four  policy recommendations: (1) ODB command needs to be a 24-month assignment, 
 
150 Quote by GEN Stanley McChrystal from Bob Woodward, “McChrystal: More Forces or ‘Mission Failure,’ 
Top U.S. Commander for Afghan War Calls Next 12 Months Decisive,” The Washington Post September 21, 2009, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com (accessed on 21 September 2009). 
151 GEN Stanley McChrystal. Official Memorandum with Subject Heading: COMISAF’s initial assessment to the 
Secretary of Defense. Dated August 30, 2009. 2.2. 
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(2) all ODB commanders should attend a Special Warfare Center (SWC) course designed 
to educate and train USSF majors (MAJ) on operational-level advisory assistance, (3) 
ODB table of organization and equipment (TOE) needs to add one additional captain 
(CPT), who already has experience commanding an ODA, to the ODB staff, and (4) 
ODB commanders need to be evaluated/rewarded for their HN advisory capability as 
much as they are evaluated/rewarded for their C2/administrative capability. 
Currently, ODB command for most of USSF MAJs lasts 12 months.  Generally, 
command at every other level in both USSF and in the conventional Army is 18-24 
months. Because USSF will continue to engage in FID/COIN operations for the next 
decade (even after conventional forces have returned to their traditional roles) coupled 
with the fact that, both organizationally and functionally, ODBs are important in 
FID/COIN because they integrate tactical and operational objectives, ODB command 
needs to be 24 months.  Modifying the current personnel rotation system to ensure that 
ODB command lasts 24 months would improve continuity and create a cadre of USSF 
officers who have a significant amount of experience conducting advisory assistance at 
both the tactical and operational level of war. 
ODBs are commanded by MAJs with experience as ODA commanders who have 
also received additional professional military education (PME) at one of the four service 
staff colleges (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps) or at the Naval Postgraduate 
School.  While their PME exposes and prepares them, conceptually, for the operational 
and strategic levels of war, the PME does not sufficiently address practical matters 
regarding advisory assistance at the operational level with HN security forces or civic 
leaders.  If USSF is to remain the most capable “off-the-shelf” FID/COIN advisory 
element in the DoD, then it must modify its PME to ensure that its MAJs are the best 
trained and educated military advisors in the DoD.  This thesis recommends a two-week 
operational advisory course at the Special Warfare Center, taught by high-performing 
former ODB commanders and battalion commanders, to pass on valuable lessons learned 
and insights related to operational level advising in FID/COIN environments.  
USSF doctrine, both past and present, supports the ODB’s role as an operational 
advisory element at a level nested above the ODA.  Doctrine dictates that ODBs provide 
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advisory assistance to both security forces and civic leaders at higher echelons than the 
ODA in order to achieve broader U.S. policy objectives.  The case studies presented in 
this thesis revealed the ODB’s ability to execute dual (military & civic) advisory roles.  
With regard to doctrine, the authors identified one policy recommendation: a modified 
table of organization and equipment (MTOE) which includes one additional captain 
(CPT/O-3) who has already served as an ODA commander.   
The current ODB TOE includes one CPT serving as the ODB executive officer 
(XO).  The policy recommendation is for the ODB to have two XOs who both have 
experience commanding ODAs.  If an additional experienced CPT were added to the 
ODB, then one CPT would serve as the XO for operations and one CPT would serve as 
the XO for administration, logistics, and support.  These two XOs would take care of 
ODB-internal matters such as: reporting to ‘higher,’ planning/resourcing future 
operations, coordinating logistical support to ODAs, managing ODB financial and 
administrative issues, and engaging in conventional force liaison duties.  The two XOs 
would already be keenly aware of the operational, logistic, and administrative needs of an 
ODA.  Presumably, the XOs would have an understanding of the ODB’s functions.  
Furthermore, the ODB XO experience for both CPTs would benefit USSF in the future 
because these CPTs will likely become ODB commanders themselves.  The addition of a 
USSF-qualified and experienced CPT on the ODB would enable the ODB commander to 
focus on his primary role of providing advisory assistance to HN security forces and civic 
leaders.  The ODB Sergeant Major (SGM) and ODB Operations Warrant Officer would 
also be able to provide staff advisory assistance to their HN counterparts rather than 
spending time addressing ODB-internal matters. 
Finally, the ODB commanders who communicate most effectively and generate 
results by, with, and through their HN counterparts need to be recognized and rewarded 
accordingly.  It is not enough that an ODB commander is operationally savvy and 
provides sound C2 and logistical support to his subordinates.  Instead, as GEN 
McChrystal states in his ISAF commanders assessment with regard to advisory 
assistance, “hard earned credibility and face to face relationships [with HN counterparts], 
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rather than close combat, will achieve success” in FID/COIN environments.152  USSF 
must ensure that it recognizes leaders who know how to work effectively with HN 
security forces and civic leaders.   Only by recognizing and rewarding ODB 
commanders, sergeants major, and senior warrant officers who seek, assume, and 
effectively execute operational advisory roles with HN elements will USSF 
leaders/commanders ensure that their ODBs are focusing on what should be a primary 








152 GEN Stanley McChrystal. Official Memorandum with Subject Heading: COMISAF’s initial assessment to the 
Secretary of Defense. Dated August 30, 2009. 2.2. 
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